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It has been argued that organisational life typically contains paradoxical situations 
such as efforts to manage change which nonetheless seem to reinforce inertia. Four 
logical options for coping with paradox have been explicated, three of which seek 
resolution and one of which ‘keeps the paradox open’. The purpose of this paper is to 
explore the potential for managerial action where the paradox is held open through the 
use of theory on ‘serious playfulness’.  Our argument is that paradoxes, as intrinsic 
features in organisational life, cannot always be resolved through cognitive processes. 
What may be possible, however, is that such paradoxes are transformed, or ‘moved 
on’ through action and as a result the overall change effort need not be stalled by the 
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 Introduction 
Organisational life contains paradoxical situations.  Such situations demand both 
individuality and coordination, and organisations need systems to support both control 
and autonomy in their employees (Bouchikhi, 1998). The practice of management in 
such situations entails dealing with the simultaneous presence of opposites (Clegg, et. 
al., 2002). Managers may need to get hidden agendas out onto the table so that action 
can be agreed as well as meeting the need to keep personal agendas private since 
otherwise agreement to act would be impossible (Huxham and Beech, 2003). 
Although apparent solutions may be found to organisational and managerial 
paradoxes, such solutions are often temporary in that they either displace the problem 
to some other organisational location (Eden, 1987) or are part of a ‘problematic 
situation’ (Checkland and Scholes, 1990) in which solutions generate new problems.  
The aim of this paper is to explore possibilities for acting within paradoxical 
situations where traditional approaches to ‘solving the problem’ are not satisfactory. 
We wish to explore the experience and consequences of holding paradox open and 
‘working with or through it,’ rather than following the more traditional route of 
resolving, removing, or simply denying the existence of paradox. 
 
In line with Poole and Van de Ven (1989), we define paradoxes in the ‘lay sense’ of 
interesting tensions, oppositions and contradictions that occur in practice.  Poole and 
Van de Van identify four options for addressing paradoxes (where A and B are two 
opposing propositions): first, accepting the paradox and maintaining and appreciating 
the contrasts between A and B; second, situating A and B at different spatial locations 
(e.g. macro and micro, or different settings within the organisation); third, situating A 
and B at different temporal locations (e.g. periods of incremental change punctuated 
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 by periods of radical change); and fourth, finding a new perspective that eliminates 
the opposition between A and B. Table 1 represents Pool and Van de Ven’s four 
options alongside our own depiction of each in terms of the managerial stance which 
might be adopted. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In both practice and theory, options 2, 3 and 4 tend to dominate as they offer apparent 
solutions (Lewis, 2000; Nooteboom, 1989). However, increasingly there have been 
calls to explore option 1 where paradoxes are held open. For example, Clegg et al. 
(2002) advocate holding the opposing poles of paradoxes apart whilst simultaneously 
seeking synthesis. Rothenberg (1979) has argued for ‘Janusian thinking’ in which 
contradictory propositions can be held to be simultaneously true. Lewis and Keleman 
(2002) have argued that multi-paradigm approaches which entertain ‘conflicting 
knowledges’ will enhance reflexivity in theory generation. In this paper we seek to 
engage with these calls by examining a theoretical addition to Poole and Van de 
Ven’s option 1 together with a practical exploration of working with paradox. We 
suggest some ideas for an approach to management that acknowledges and engages 
with the messy, paradoxical and incomplete reality of everyday organisational 
experience.   
 
Option 1, keeping the paradox open, whilst being an intriguing idea, could be viewed 
as different from the other three options in a fundamental sense. In rejecting the 
intellectually structured drives towards harmonious unity implicit in the other three 
options it rejects end-driven rational action and the tendency to reduce complex 
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 dynamics to simple “either-or” choices and “both-and” syntheses (Stacey et. al., 
2001).  As such, the modernist tendency to try to disentangle experience into familiar 
dichotomies such as subject-object, thinking-acting and individual-social, is replaced 
by a view in which the paradoxical dimensions of experience are created and 
recreated in different patterns of interacting. In keeping paradox open, action can be 
seen as an essentially creative or transformative phenomenon in which individuals 
interact to contribute and respond to shifting and unpredictable patterns of private 
intention and embodied expression (Joas, 1996).  
 
This description of action calls to mind the experience of taking part in a game.  In 
games, experience is intentional but unpredictable in detail. Games are highly social 
in the sense that most are inherently interactive and governed by agreed rules, and 
they involve the expressive contributions of individuals who play to their own 
embodied attributes and emotional drives in a spontaneous manner. 
 
One way of conceptualising action in option 1, ‘keeping the paradox open’, is to 
develop the concept of ‘serious play’ (Gergen, 1992), which in turn relates to prior 
theory on games. The theorizing of games in organisations identifies the rational 
engagement for gain, the structuring of conformity to rules (Crozier, 1985) and the 
power, either overt or disguised, in the structure of the games (Frost, 1987). However, 
there is another side to games as they contain contradictions (Crozier and Friedberg, 
1980). For example, players remain free, but also must adopt strategies that conform 
to the nature and rules of the game if they are to win.  
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 Games entail qualities that are potentially useful in those paradoxical situations 
encountered in organisational settings. First, they are not purely rational but also 
incorporate desire and emotion (e.g. the desire to belong or the desire to win). There is 
a sense in which, whilst playing, concepts, emotions and bodily movements become 
merged in such a way as to subvert the Cartesian hierarchy in which action is 
controlled by and follows from thought (Joas, 1996). Secondly, as Gergen (1992) 
points out, games incorporate not only conformity to rules but also creativity (e.g. in 
the novel application of rules to gain advantage). In gaming, minor changes to the 
structure of rules can create unstable conditions from which new adaptive forms of 
connection or system can emerge (Coveney and Highfield, 1995; MacIntosh and 
MacLean, 1999). Thirdly, playfulness introduces jokes, puns and postures, many of 
which rely on words and gestures having multiple meanings, and these may be of use 
in engaging with multiple realities embedded in some paradoxes.  Multiple meanings 
can be revealed as unexpected connections and disconnections between divergent but 
co-present versions of the organisational story (Boje, 1995). Fourthly, games enable 
participants to challenge the normal boundaries of behaviour, for example, they may 
allow for touching, verbal expression, and competitiveness that may not be permitted 
in the normality of everyday life.  
 
Using serious play as a framework for keeping the paradox open whilst acting is 
intended to introduce an alternative to ‘solving’ the paradox. Rather than focusing in 
on ‘one best way’, our contention is that there is a need for a ‘shifting stock’ of 
experimental practices which can be used as the basis for elaboration and 
improvisation (Gabriel, 2002).  
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 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
In summary, the concept of serious playfulness entails purposeful action, but action 
which is:  
• driven by emotion and the body, not simply rationality 
• notable in its creativity in terms of both adherence to, and disruption of, rules 
• involves play between multiple meanings 
• challenges normal boundaries through experimentation. 
 
This conceptualisation aids the process of keeping paradoxes open since it provides 
some potential lines of exploration.   
 
The paper will examine an empirical example in which the four options are worked 
through.  We pay particular attention to option 1, where we attempt to operationalize 
the concept of serious playfulness. Following this, we proceed to offer some 




Our research process was one of action research (Eden and Huxham, 1996) and was 
highly engaged with practice, seeking as it did, to produce knowledge in mode 2 
(Gibbons et. al., 1994, MacLean et. al., 2002). As action researchers, we had 
developed a basic theoretical framework (serious playfulness) to underpin a practical 
exploration of option 1, holding paradox open, but we were seeking a more detailed 
understanding and enrichment of our framework through an experimental engagement 
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 in some practical issue or problem. As such, we envisaged embarking on an iterative 
process whereby the framework would be used to inform novel approaches to paradox 
in practice, and the experience of such endeavours would provide material for 
reflection, theory-building and subsequent actions. 
 
The authors formed a multidisciplinary team comprising healthcare professionals and 
management researchers, seeking both to develop new forms of organisation in 
healthcare and to deepen our understanding of alternatives to traditional modes of 
healthcare management. The team brought different perspectives to the problem 
which enabled a flow, not only between action in the situation, theorizing events, and 
subsequent action, but also between conceptual stances with areas of both agreement 
and disagreement (Lewis and Grimes, 1999). 
 
The aim of such research is not to present a case study of the organisation, nor to 
provide proof of generalisable conclusions. Rather, the purpose is to extract from a 
broad and rich experience of organisational processes over time, lessons which reflect 
emergent theorizing (Eisenhardt, 1989), and which may be applicable/adaptable by 
other researchers and practitioners. In this sense, the concept of paradox as invitation 
to act is a ‘generative mechanism’ (Tsoukas, 1989) for both action, and theorizing on 
the basis of data which are particular to a local context (Eisenhardt, 1989; Alvesson 
and Karreman, 2000). 
 
Empirical Context: policy dimensions 
The empirical illustrations are drawn from a project in the UK’s National Health 
Service. The setting relates to the development and introduction of a new approach to 
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 cancer treatment services on a national scale. Adverse comment in a number of media 
about figures suggesting that patients in the UK had a poor survival after being 
diagnosed with cancer led to political dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the 
NHS in treating cancer.  In 1995, a policy document, known as the Calman-Hine 
Report, was published which represented the government’s thinking on how the 
situation could be improved (Chief Medical Officers of England and Wales, 1995).  
The main thrust of the Calman-Hine Report, as perceived by the clinicians involved in 
providing cancer treatment, was to reorganise cancer services into those provided in 
“Cancer Centres” and those provided in “Cancer Units.”  Cancer Centres were seen as 
those hospitals which could provide care for complex problems. They had an 
extensive range of services on site and, by centralising care of complex cancers on 
fewer sites, it was hoped that survival rates would improve. Cancer Centres would 
mainly be designated in University teaching hospitals. Cancer units, on the other 
hand, were likely to be based in District General Hospitals (DGHs). They would offer 
a simpler range of services and would be expected to refer complex or difficult 
patients to a Cancer Centre for treatment. This polarization of treatment on the basis 
of institutional size and complexity caused considerable concern amongst clinicians 
who felt that it did not give due recognition to clinical competence.  “Just because you 
work in a teaching hospital doesn’t make you a good surgeon and working in a DGH 
doesn’t make you a bad surgeon” [Cancer Surgeon].   
 
Initial discussion of this issue also took place at a time when the NHS was being 
organised as an internal market for health care. A central directive to refer patients to 
certain hospitals caused concern that resources would flow away from institutions that 
had been treating cancer successfully and towards cancer centres whose success in 
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 treating cancer was, at least in some cases, felt to be unproven. In the light of these 
concerns, many clinicians decided not to engage in the process of centralisation of 
services.  
Empirical Context: clinical dimensions  
From the description above, it is clear that policymakers found themselves confronted 
with a problematic change situation.  They had approved a plan which they thought 
would improve treatment outcomes for patients.  However, doctors who felt that the 
new arrangements for care would have exactly the opposite effect were resisting 
implementation of this plan.  Moving forward in this problematic situation was not 
straightforward. Doctors deliver care within the NHS according to ethical standards 
laid down by their regulatory body (the General Medical Council). Managers of 
hospitals in the NHS cannot and do not prescribe the clinical decisions taken by 
doctors, so the conventional arrangements by which managers control the activity of 
production staff in many other organisational settings are ineffective.  Also, managers 
in the health service have a prime interest in the organisational unit which they 
manage, whilst doctors are largely focused on the wellbeing of individual patients.  
 
Hence, there were tensions between three groups: policy makers who advocated 
centralisation, managers who, largely, saw themselves as agents of government but 
who might feel their organisations liable to lose revenue if they were not designated 
cancer centres and doctors who often felt their patients liable to suffer if proposals to 
centralise care were implemented. 
 
Following an initial failed attempt to implement the Calman-Hine report, 
policymakers invited Jack, a clinician with extensive experience in treatment of 
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 cancer, into this situation to advise on and implement a ‘more robust’ programme to 
improve the outcomes of cancer treatment.   
 
The Paradox:  
the need for services which are simultaneously centralised yet decentralised 
 
On starting the project, Jack had “no clear view what the eventual outcome would 
be.”  It was however, clear that any changes he might recommend needed to deliver 
clinical outcomes which were demonstrably better than those achieved by the existing 
arrangements.  To be acceptable, the eventual system had to incorporate a process of 
continuous quality improvement based on peer-reviewed audit of clinical practice.  
 
With this prior condition, Jack embarked on a series of visits to the management 
teams of almost thirty hospitals and the clinicians working in them who treated 
cancer.  A number of themes emerged from these encounters. 
 
(i) Management assumptions. 
Hospital managers were generally supportive of the Calman-Hine plan. It based 
cancer care around institutions of different sizes and, while some managers were 
unhappy at the suggestion that their institution would not be considered a cancer 
centre, the institutional basis of service organisation was something they assumed 
would be part of any solution. 
 
(ii) Clinical cooperation across institutional boundaries. 
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 Throughout the discussions, clinicians emphasised the importance of 
multidisciplinary care for cancer patients. Not all clinical disciplines are represented 
in all hospitals. Clinicians expressed concern that they should continue to have access 
to experts in other hospitals if they were to provide the best possible care for their 
patients. An institutional configuration was not acceptable to many clinicians. 
 
(iii) Hospital care vs. Prevention as ways to control cancer. 
Since its creation, the NHS has been split in the way in which care is provided. 
General practitioners deal with most initial contact with patients while hospital 
doctors provide more specialist care. The NHS has not traditionally had much interest 
in prevention of ill health, yet much is known about prevention of cancer. It is often 
argued that it is more efficient for any population to invest in prevention rather than 
treatment of cancer. Some public health experts argued that an organisational solution 
for cancer should be based on a geographically defined population rather than be 
based on the “customers” referred to a hospital. Adopting such units of organisation 
would allow clinicians – and particularly primary care clinicians - to take a stronger 
interest in prevention. 
 
(iv) Habit in clinical practice. 
A common response among clinicians when visited was: “why do we need to change? 
We have good results and our patients like what we do.” Usually these assertions 
were made without any objective data to support either the contention that patients 
were satisfied with their treatment or that treatment was of an acceptable standard. 
Discussion in these circumstances occasionally became acrimonious and difficult as 
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 Jack made it plain to those clinicians who were reluctant to change that objective 
evidence of excellence was necessary if the status quo was to be supported. 
 
(v) Incompatible aspirations: of managers for control of clinical practice, and of 
clinicians for freedom in how they practiced.   
Ultimately, it was clear to Jack that managers had insufficient insight into the nuances 
of complex, multidisciplinary cancer treatment to allow them to manage services in 
the way they felt was needed.  Similarly, clinicians in individual institutions needed to 
participate in an audit of practice that was transparent to their peers. Where peers 
were unhappy with the results of an audit, reluctant clinicians would have to agree to 
change their practices.  Failure to adopt best practice would constitute clear breach of 
clinical standards and ethics and lead to sanctions. Exchanges of this nature were rare 
but when they occurred, they were associated with much bluff and bluster on the part 
of defensive clinicians. What was being proposed was no more than what was 
required by professional organisations such as the Royal Colleges. Clinicians were 
clearly the only people who could persuade other clinicians to change. 
 
The Paradox Transformed? 
Having set out the problematic change situation in some detail, we now turn to 
consider ways to engage or resolve the centralised-decentralised paradox.  In 
examining this situation we consider all four of Poole and Van de Ven’s responses to 
paradox and we use serious playfulness to structure a more detailed exposition of 
option 1.  In so doing, we hope to offer some insight into our theorizing process and 
to illustrate the way in which a paradoxical situation was maintained yet transformed 
through action.  At this stage, we note that Jack’s experience of the paradox was 
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 undergoing a subtle shift through his engagement with it. Rather than a simple 
cognitive distinction between centralised and decentralised services, Jack’s initial 
interactions revealed the poles of the paradox as embodied in opposing groups: 
clinicians (decentralised services) and managers (centralised services). The paradox as 
experienced by Jack was thus possibly transforming into that of clinically-led 
organisation yet managerially-led organisation, each of which was incompatible with 
the other, as will be described in detail in the next section.  First though, we will look 
at this problematic change situation in relation to options 2, 3 and 4 from Poole and 
Van de Ven’s schema.  
 
Option 2 requires a spatial separation of the conflicting elements. ‘Space’ in the sense 
that it is used here may be organisational space. So, for example, it could be decided 
that there was a single hierarchy with managerial positions above clinical ones, and 
once a clinician moved upwards into a managerial position, he or she would become a 
manager not a clinician. This would privilege the managerial side of the paradox and 
would not be a seriously acceptable ‘solution’ for those on the other side. 
Alternatively, the clinical side could be privileged by, for example, having a 
committee of practising clinicians who made the strategic and budgetary decisions 
that would subsequently be implemented by managers. Both these solutions carry new 
problems with them. For example, they assume a separation between strategy and 
enactment, whereas it can be argued that enactment has implications for, and changes, 
strategy as it occurs, and that incrementalism is a more realistic understanding of the 
strategy-implementation interaction (Pettigrew, 1992). 
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 Option 3 would be a temporal separation between clinical and managerial tasks. So, 
for example, clinical managers could undertake clinical duties for some of the time 
and managerial duties at other times. This is a pattern of work which is adopted in 
various parts of the health service. In practice this may privilege one side or the other, 
depending on where the quality and quantity of time is focused. As with option 2, this 
temporal option also produces new problems. For example, there could be problems 
with a person being perceived as developing and maintaining the requisite skill and 
knowledge levels if they are spending half their time and energy on other activities. It 
would be possible for full-time members of the clinical and managerial groups finding 
ways of undermining the views of someone working with dual roles which were 
temporalized in this way. 
  
Option 4 would seek a synthesis between the two sides. This may entail arguing that 
solutions in health care cannot be either clinical or managerial alone, rather they must 
involve a synthesis of the views of both sides. A possibility would be to incorporate 
management training as part of the clinical education in order to produce a hybrid 
clinician-manager.  Some medical degree programmes have moved to introduce 
management training in the form of optional modules or the ability to intercalate the 
medical degree with a one-year MBA or MSc qualification in management.  As with 
the other solutions, option four could produce new problems. For example, if a new 
breed of hybrid professional were produced, there would be the potential for conflict 
between graduates of the new and the old systems. Even if a hybrid were produced, it 
is unlikely that it would be an equal match. It is far more likely that the clinical 
education and requirements for excellence would predominate over the managerial 
ones, or vice versa. If there were an equal division between managerial and clinical 
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 education and training, there would be a danger that the hybrids would be regarded as 
not sufficiently specialist in either side, and that they were  ‘jacks of all trades’ rather 
than full professionals. 
 
It can be seen that whilst each of the above options deals with the appearance of 
paradox in its own particular fashion, collectively they seek to reduce, collapse or 
displace paradox. In so doing, they often introduce other problems, perhaps associated 
with what are tantamount to attempts to fillet everyday organisational life of its 
paradoxical backbone.  In the area of cancer care, policy driven change required 
“managing” either by people whose expertise and credibility in cancer care required 
them to distance themselves from the practices of management, or whose expertise in 
management deprived them of the necessary knowledge of, and influence in, cancer 
care.  Paradoxically, integration of these perspectives seems like an obvious solution, 
and yet the perspectives rely on differentiation for their existence. 
 
Treating Paradox as an Invitation to Act 
The alternative to the three options discussed above is to explore Poole and Van de 
Ven’s option 1, in which the paradox is held open.  By “held open” we mean that one 
actively resists the temptation to achieve intellectually driven closure (as in options 2-
4) and instead pursues the kind of practically driven action that characterises the 
behaviours which occur during game play.  By adopting this stance, the existence of 
paradox in problematic change situations can be viewed as an invitation to take part in 
a game in which serious playfulness encourages the actor to engage fully with the 
sensory, emotional and intellectual dimensions of paradoxical experience.  Hence, we 
now turn to ideas concerning serious playfulness in order to work with paradox as an 
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 invitation to act, rather than an intellectual puzzle to be thought through. From 
Gergen’s initial concept of serious play, we have elaborated four dimensions of a 
framework for action (see figure 1) and will now go through each of these in turn.  
 
a. Expressing Emotion 
Clinicians who felt that their clinical freedom was being curtailed unfairly by the 
Calman-Hine proposals expressed considerable anxiety and anger.  “I am 
supposed to refer all my cancer patients to Mr X in the University Hospital. He 
worked with me as a trainee. He was useless when he came here, and not much 
better when he left,” [experienced consultant working in a DGH].  “We’re 
supposed to refer our patients to hospital A,” said a group of consultants in a rural 
hospital. “Our patients prefer to go to hospital B,” they said, naming a hospital in 
another town which was more centrally located and was noted for its shopping 
facilities. The apparently arbitrary nature of the decisions made by management 
caused irritation and unwillingness to collaborate in the new system. 
 
Such expressions could engender resistance to change. However, in this setting, 
emotional conflict, which would not normally be acceptable, was accepted by 
Jack. By empathising with these expressions of anger and frustration Jack helped 
clinicians recognise the need for change.  This in turn made clinicians more 
interested in developing alternative ways forward. 
 
b. Challenging Rules 
Since the one unambiguous objective of any new emergent system was to ensure 
that care was of a higher standard than the system preceding it, new rules relating 
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 to peer review, implementation of agreed pathways of care and opportunities for 
new patterns of resource allocation for cancer care suggested new approaches to 
managing care.  Prior to this point, some clinicians saw audit as an optional 
activity and most clinicians regarded it as something to be done in private, without 
management interference.  Similarly, most managers felt that allocation of 
resources was their responsibility and clinicians were encouraged to challenge this 
assumption in their efforts to improve outcome of care. 
 
c. Exploiting Ambiguity 
In dealing with those involved in the exercise, Jack employed multiple meanings, 
for example, of the term ‘management’.  He was sometimes scornful about 
management as a group when in the presence of clinicians (although he did not 
always perceive himself in this way).  However, in relation to management as a 
process, he appeared more favourably disposed, albeit to a new formulation of 
management. This ambiguity helped retain the creative tension of paradox: 
centralisation is bad, centralisation is good. This tension enabled novel action 
rather than stasis in oppositional groups of management and clinicians. To clarify 
matters, by adopting either centralisation or decentralisation, would have 
engendered resistance by the ‘losers’ and would have generated new problems in 
itself. 
 
d. Experimenting with Boundaries 
The behaviour of the project leader helped to challenge the boundaries of 
behaviour and facilitate the emergence of new practices and new forms of 
organisation. In particular, managers required a degree of openness and 
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 auditability from clinicians. Clinicians were often resistant to the notion that data 
on their clinical practice could be made available to mangers in anything other 
than anonymised form. Jack was able to point out to the clinicians that poor 
outcome might not necessarily be due to incompetence but might also be due to 
lack of resources to allow adequate treatment. In the latter case, the responsibility 
would lie with the manager. Jack helped redefine the boundary of what was 
acceptable to clinicians and this redefinition helped create a climate which 
allowed the clinicians to engage with possible alternative ways of working. There 
was a traditional boundary to creating transparency. At points during which the 
traditional conception was challenged, greater transparency was achieved. Having 
said this, in clinical circles the knowledge was not new as ‘everyone knew’ where 
the standards of practiced varied. But, under normal circumstances, such 
knowledge remained unobtainable for managers and, in practice, clinical 
judgement as to who produced best outcomes was often shown to be inaccurate 
once audit data was collected.  Other forms of experimentation involved 
encouraging transcendence of traditional boundaries which existed between 
primary and secondary care provision in order to ensure better continuity of care 
for patients. 
 
The Paradox Transformed 
Using concepts from serious playfulness, a range of different types of action and 
intervention formed the basis of experimentation.  The challenge facing Jack was to 
create a system that improved prospects for prevention and cure of cancer. Managers 
wanted control of a system for which they felt accountable. Government policy 
supported a classical top-down arrangement which reduced options for clinicians in 
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 how and where patients were treated and so seemed, to angry clinicians, to give 
managers unacceptable levels of control over their clinical practice.  Clinicians, on the 
other hand, argued that the multidisciplinary nature of cancer medicine required cross 
institutional links. They produced evidence that outcome was more dependent on the 
integrity of multidisciplinary teams than on the number of patients treated by 
individual clinicians. In return for recognition of these concerns, clinicians seemed 
prepared to contribute to transparent audit of their practice. 
 
Jack’s recommendation was to accept that health service managers remained 
accountable for costs and outcomes of treatment in the hospitals they managed while 
supporting the clinicians desire to work across institutional boundaries. He 
recommended the creation of “Managed Cancer Networks” in which clinicians in 
each region dealing with individual cancers would work in a networked way to peer 
review each other’s practice. For example, all the clinicians involved in treating lung 
cancer in a region would participate in a lung cancer network. They would be 
provided with some management support to facilitate the activity of the network but 
they would individually remain employees of, and accountable to, their hospitals. The 
network would report to hospital managers on the results obtained by clinicians 
employed by them but would also raise issues of resource scarcity that the network 
felt impaired the ability of clinicians to practice effective cancer medicine. Health 
service managers agreed an allocation of money to permit the creation of 
teleconferencing links to facilitate clinical contact across the network.  
 
Rather than attempt to close down or resolve the paradoxical need for cancer services 
which were centralised yet decentralised, we have provided an account of an attempt 
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 to hold the paradox open.  In so doing however, the paradox itself was transformed.  
The original tension between centralisation and decentralisation changed through the 
early stages of developing a network approach to service provision.  The paradox 
became manifest as a tension between managers and clinicians. 
 
Three years after the publication of this plan (NHS Scotland, 2001), networks are 
publishing audit results. Investment plans are agreed annually between networks and 
health authorities. Frustration still exists on the part of managers who feel that their 
ability to control clinical care is impaired by the existence of the networks. Clinicians 
remain frustrated by their feeling that networks are not taken seriously by hospital 
managers. In fact, managers have more insight into standards of clinical care because 
they are getting more audit data than they would have under the previous system and 
doctors have benefited from having a higher level of input into investment decisions. 
 
The paradox has been held open in that managers continue to have responsibility for 
care while clinicians have been given permission to work outside conventional 
institutional boundaries. Clinical processes have demonstrably changed as a result of 
the organisational ‘solution’ which emerged into the gap between management and 
clinician aspiration.  
 
The framework for action presents four dimensions of serious play, and we have 
attempted to highlight aspects of the way in which the inherent paradox is maintained, 
treated as an invitation to act and transformed through that action.  By considering 
management as a process, and by describing this process of management in terms of 
the negotiation and application of rules governing the operation of the new cancer 
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 network, and embodied in the decision maker (whether they be clinician or manager) 
the paradox is both maintained and transformed.  Thus, those concerned have in some 
senses moved beyond the need for, and impossibility of, having managers who are 
doctors by focusing on a self-management process.  Nevertheless, underlying tensions 
between clinicians and managers still exist, and these paradoxical tensions are 
beginning to centre on the nature of the network’s rules, who conceives them, and 
how they are policed. 
 
Serious Play as a Way of Keeping the Paradox Open 
 
Our aim has been to explore the possibility of ‘keeping paradoxes open’ through 
serious play. When Jack was originally commissioned to develop a new system of 
cancer care it was assumed that some kind of resolution or accommodation would be 
found that would bring the managerial and clinical views together. Such an outcome 
was unlikely since the objectives of managers centre around the efficient running of 
their institutions whilst clinicians  - even those clinicians who also fulfil a 
management role - are judged on how effectively they treat individual patients. 
Creating a cadre of clinicians trained in management would not have resolved this 
paradox since the basic skills required for the two roles are far from complementary. 
Attempts to resolve the paradox by a synthesis of views would have been doomed to 
failure for this reason.  
 
The illustrative paradoxical situation was ‘moved on’ through the use of emotional 
expression and personal contact in the place of purely rational arguments where 
professionals were supported through processes that were not presented as neatly 
resolvable.  Indeed, frustrations still exist, but through changing the typical 
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 boundaries of emotional expression they now exist as part of a changed situation 
rather than fuelling resistance and ‘stand off’ between the parties. We have illustrated 
how rules were challenged and recast, introducing some instability and maintaining 
the fluidity of an interactive ‘game’. The cancer care network experimented with 
organisational boundaries, building new links between clinical disciplines, institutions 
and individuals.  The normal boundaries of behaviour were challenged, as clinicians 
did “what doctors do not do,” and the normal forms of control were subverted within 
the network.  The multiplicity of meaning and exploitation of ambiguity was 
important - enabling the co-present conceptualisation of management as both good 
and bad.  Without this neither clinicians nor managers would have been able agree to 
movement.   
 
The four dimensions of serious play presented in this paper can act as a stimulus for 
alternative or complementary forms of action. On reflection, a number of points can 
be made about serious play as a way of acting through paradoxical situations. First, it 
is not the case that all the four elements of play identified in theory are necessarily 
equally present in practice. In this case, it was not clear how much of each element 
would be present in advance, and there was a need for those engaged in practice to 
make judgements about how to proceed once the activity was already underway. 
 
Secondly, as with other games, it is not necessarily the case that radically different 
actions are undertaken, rather it is the setting and subtle reversals that constitute the 
actions as play. For example, in play sword-fighting, the players enact a fight, but in a 
way that parodies an actual fight, using non-harmful weapons. And if the play fight 
ends with one person being hurt, it is typically the person who did the hurting who is 
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 in trouble - a reversal of the rules in genuine combat. In the illustration presented, 
some of the actions such as seeking ways of altering the rules of engagement are not 
in themselves revolutionary, but the ways in which the setting is managed and the 
nature of outcomes make the impact and meaning of such actions different. Hence, 
playful actions can be simulacra of mundane actions in which there is a 
transformation of meaning that enables a transformation of taken-for-granted 
boundaries of behaviour. 
 
Thirdly, notwithstanding its name, serious play is not necessarily fun. It can entail 
pain and conflict when people are challenged to act outside their normal behavioural 
repertoires, and to challenge their normal assumptions.  Even when, from an external 
perspective, it would appear that the new state of affairs would be preferable for the 
actors in the situation, they may perceive things differently. For example, one might 
think that removing the impression of a group of professionals that “the managers are 
bad and incompetent” would result in greater happiness. However, this is not 
necessarily the case where the “bad managers” conception had been fulfilling some 
other function for the professional group such as a scapegoat function (Douglas, 
1995).  
 
Fourthly, although we are interpreting serious play positively, it is possible for actors 
in the situation to interpret it negatively, for example as incompetence, prevarication 
or as a political tactic. These different ‘readings’ can result in conflictual social 
outcomes. Such outcomes are undesirable because they increase the likelihood of 
dichotomising perceptions in the paradoxical situation, and right/wrong dichotomised 
representations of paradoxes may militate against action. For those who believe 
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 themselves to be in the right and their oppositional group to be wrong, the obvious 
conclusion is more of the same behaviour. 
 
Fifthly, in adopting serious play as a tactic, actors must be aware that their intentions 
may be subverted through the play. Serious play entails planning, and yet it may also 
entail the abandonment of plans.  In this sense it may represent an alternative to 
cognitivist approaches to problem solving. It requires a mind-set accepting of 





In problematic management situations (Checkland and Scholes, 1990) contradictions, 
tensions and paradoxes can, and frequently do, arise (Bouchikhi, 1998; Lewis, 2000; 
Clegg et. al., 2002).  It may be possible to resolve such paradoxes through the 
separation of the contradictory elements over time or space or through synthesis 
(Poole and Van de Ven, 1989), but sometimes resolution may not be possible or 
desirable.  We would argue that the common propensity towards resolution of 
paradoxes through options 2 – 4 should be challenged, and that ‘living with paradox’ 
should not be regarded as necessarily the worst option.  We would argue that options 
2, 3 and 4 often hold the promise of solving problematic situations, but that in practice 
such ‘solutions’ may not deliver progress.  Our exploration of paradox as an invitation 
to act might indicate that the pursuit of option 1 is a viable option. 
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 Furthermore, we suggest that a positive way of confronting problematic change 
situations is to regard paradox as an invitation to act rather than seeking to ‘think 
oneself out of the problem’. Seeking cognitive solutions could lead to inertia, whilst 
acting in the situation, acknowledging the messiness entailed by this, can help to 
transform, rather than remove, the paradox. We believe that the dimensions of serious 
play offer a framework for action in such situations. We have suggested that adopting 
the dimensions of serious play (focusing on desire and emotion; being creative in the 
application and recreation of rules; exploiting the multiplicity of meanings; and 
challenging the normal boundaries of behaviour), can offer a helpful guide to 
productive action.   
 
We acknowledge that there is an ethical dimension to such game playing. Questions 
can be raised about how acceptable it is for some actors to be indulging in 
experimentation and play when others are earnest in their actions. This is particularly 
the case where one group of actors is subject to the experiment by others who have 
greater power. 
 
We should also emphasise that it is not our proposal that serious play is a panacea. 
We have specifically conceived it in paradoxical settings where other options for 
resolving the paradoxes are problematic.  We accept that there may be situations 
where Poole and Van de Ven’s options 2, 3 or 4 may be both feasible and preferable.  
In this paper we have sought to offer a means of operationalizing option 1, to move 
beyond the somewhat passive connotation of the term “holding it open”, and in so 
doing, we have argued against an inherent and perhaps inappropriate tendency to 
default to other options which resolve, close down or deny the existence of paradox.   
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We would suggest that in such situations where action would otherwise be stifled by 
trying to find resolution through cognition as a precursor to action, regarding paradox 
as an invitation to act might offer a way of ‘moving-on’.  We might add that 
managers, who, consciously or otherwise, overlook the possibility of transformative 
action in paradoxical situations and focus exclusively on problem-solving approaches 
may be denying to their organisations a basic stimulus to creative action. 
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Figure 1. Serious Play in Practice 
 
